Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

George C. Maw et al v. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District and Ogden Duck Club :
Appellants' Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Neil R. Olmstead; E. J. Skeen; Attorneys for Respondents;
Glen E. Fuller; Attorney for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, No. 9950 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4338

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH

E

GEORGE C. MAW, W. EU~EN,E
MAW, ORLO S. MAW ana FER,363
RELL J. MAW, R. JOHN MAW \!
and JUNIOR B. MAW, VIRGIL
------------------~-~
G. MAW and VADEL T. M:AW~z--s~~ ~~.;~--c~~rl. u·:-.,:.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Civil No.
9950

vs.

WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT and
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPELL~S

REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second District Court for Weber County
Bon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge

E. J. Skeen
Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Neil R. Olmstead
2324 Adams Avenue
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Respondents

Glen E. Fuller
15 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ARG U~IENT --------------·······-······································ 4
POINT I. PLAINTIFFS WERE DENIED
TI[E OPPORTUNITY OF PUTTING ON
EYIDENCE ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT
EYIDENCE RELATING TO THE 1936
AGREEMENT. ---··········--···························-·····--··--·· 4
POINT II. THE COURT WAS ADVISED
OF PL.A.INTIFFS' THEORIES OF RECOVERY AT THE PRE-TRIAL STAGE. .............. 6
CONCLUSION ------------------------------·················-····-··- 13

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORG-E C. l\IAW, W. EUGENE )
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Plaintiffs and Appellants~_,

I

vs.

,.
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9950
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SERYANCY DISTRICT and
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah
Corporation,
-.~
Defendants-Respondents. _-

1

APPELL~TS'

REPLY BRIEF

Because of two major areas of argument contained
in Respondent's brief which appellants contend are inaccurate, misleading and contrary to the record, appellants submit this reply brief in order that the Court
will have the true picture of what happened at the pretrial proceedings before it.
3
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ARGUMENT.
I. PLAINTIFFS WERE DENIED TilE
OPPORTUNIT-Y OF PUTTING ON EVIDENCE ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 1936 AGREEMENT.
On Pages 4, 19 an~. ?O of respondent's brief the
contention is raised with references· to the transcript,
that the Court repeatedly offtred to permit plaintiffs
to put on evidence in support of their position. On
the face of such an ·argument such a broad generalization might appear logical, but the references in respondents' brief and the quotations containing discussions between the Court and· counsel for appellants
have been taken out of context. Because of this a word
of explanation is in order.
At the pre-trial hearing of February 14, 1963, the
Court first addressed its analysis of the situation as to
whether or not appellants had a cause of action against
the Ogden Duck Club, and it proceeded to analyze
that portion of the case first. 0 bviously, since the liability against the Ogden Duck Club rested in a large
measure on an interpretation of the 1936 Agreement
between Annie C. Maw and the Ogden Duck. Club, it
was necessary to fully exa1nine the Agreement. As to
the Agreement appellants have stated· that they were
not in a position, after the lapse of m~ny years, to pro·
duce evidence. which would alter or explain the meaning
of that document other than as the conduct of the vari·
4
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litigants would tend to interpret it over a series
of years. In fact, .n-Ir. Skeen and other counsel for
respondents raised an issue of law as to whether, if
attempted, such evidence could be introduced (Tr. 17).
To this approach counsel for appellants agreed, relying upon the ambiguity contained within the four corners of the instrument and the course of conduct of the
parties over the years to explain that ambiguity.
ous

It is true, as has been referred to by respondent
in its references to various portions of the transcript,
the appellants declined at each point when the matter
was raised to put on evidence which would tend to vary
the meaning of the 1936 Agreement other than the type
of eddence just referred it. However, appellants at no
paint declined to put on evidence of its other theories
of the case_, and particularly evidence relating to its
claims against the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District!
It was not until the conclusion of the pre-trial proceedings on the day involved that the Court finally
turned its attention to the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and after a short discussion summarily dismissed the action against it. The bulk of the
discussion at the pre-trial hearing was concerned with
the Ogden Duck Club. And the references made by
respondents to the brief and the Court's offer to permit
plaintiffs to put on evidence relating to a different meaning which might be given the 1936 Agreement all related to the claim against the Ogden Duck Club.

5
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THE COURT: The court will invite the
Plaintiff at this time, if they choose to do so, to
present evidence which would give to this document, Exhibit A., some special or unusual meaning. (Tr. 39).
It was not until page 44 of the transcript that the
Court got around to discussing the matter of the liability of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District.
This can best be illustrated by references to the very
transcript involved.
MR. FULLER: No, not necessarily. We
proceeded against the Weber Basin on the estoppel theory and the contract theory as well.
THE COURT: We will get to that in a minute. (Tr. 42).

*

*

*

*

THE COURT: I will let the Defendant club
out of the lawsuit. Let me talk about the Weber
Basin just a little bit, and make certain I have
got this straight now . . . ( Tr. 44) .
When respondents claim that "the Court offered
to impanel the jury and to hear the evidence in supp~rt
of the appellants' position, and each time the offer was
refused . . . ,'' they are simply trying to confuse the
matter by lifting a limited portion of the Pre-trial
hearing out of context, and attempting to apply it to the
entire lawsuit.
II. THE COURT WAS ADVISED OF
PLAINTIFFS' THEORIES OF RECOVERY
AT THE PRE-TRIAL STAGE.
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As indicated in a quotation in the preceding point
of /ugument, the Court was advised at the Pre-trial
bearing by appellants' counsel that action was taken
against the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District
" .. on the estoppel theory and contract theory as well."
l•'urther, after the Court finished its discussion relating
l(J the liability of the Ogden Duck Club at page 44 of
the trancript, the Court was fully advised of appellants'
position when discussions relating to the liability of
the
eber Basin Water Conservancy District took
place:
THE COURT: What is your theory?

'V

MR. FULLER: Well, our theory is this, the
theory is exactly this, before the Maws would
sell these lands or Val (Orlo) Maw in particular,
you were President of W. John Maw & Sons
Company, weren't you?
MR. VAL (ORLO) lVIAW: Yes.
~IR. FULLER: Entered into a series of negotiations and these hunting rights were spelled
out very clearly to the negotiators for the Weber
Basin District and Orlo Maw steadfastly refused to sign and sell the land involved without
the Duck Club's shooting privileges for himself
and other members of the family being settled.
I-Iis testimony would be that he insisted that he
get assurance in the form that he did from Mr.
Fjeldsted's letter before he would sign and sell
the lands, otherwise, he would have insisted that
they condemn all of the property rights the Maws
had inclu~ing the large tract of land, and that
upon getting these assurances and in discussions
he had with ·who, you talked with who, Mr.
Skeen"?
7
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MR. ORLO MAW: Concerning these rights,
Mr. Ed. Skeen. Yes.
MR. FULLER: What about Mr. George
Smith, their appraiser1
MR. ORLO MAW: Mr. George Smith, their
appraiser, we talked at length with him.
MR. FULLER: Anyway, as a result of this,
in order to purchase the land without a condemnation suit that was the' arrangement that was
made. Had there been a condemnation suit, these
hunting rights would have been brought into the
matter. (Tr. 47}.

*

*

*

*

MR. MAW: They informed me that by preparing this letter to protect all rights which I
had no right to sell, that we would avoid a condemnation suit by proceeding with the contract and I refused to sign the contract until the
protection, and all of us concerned were given
protection and as a result the letter was prepared before I signed the contract. Otherwise,
I would have let it go in the condemnation. (Tr.
51}.

The foregoing simply refutes the bold assertion
made by respondents at page 19 of their brief when they
say: "No argument of the Third-Party beneficiary
theory was made to the trial court."
As further support to the fact that the Court at
Pre-trial was fully aware of the contentions against the
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, we should
have a closer look at the record. From the index of the
record one can readily see that pre-trial proceedings
8
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occurred on November 5, 1962, on December 19, 1962,
and on February 14, 1963. At the Pre-trial hearing
on November 5, 1962, the Court requested plaintiffs
to submit a statement of its legal theories against the
two defendants by December 10, 1962, so that a further
Pre-trial hearing could be had in the matter. Accordingly, on the date set for the second pre-trial hearing
on December 10, 1962, there was filed in the matter
(R. 30) the statement requested by the Court, which
set forth very clearly the theories of recovery which
plaintiffs would advance as to each defendant. Because
of the suggestion that there were new matters before
the Court, we take the liberty of printing that portion
of the Record at this time in its entirety:

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF LEGAL
THEORIES AGAINST DEFENDANTS
Civil No. 36819
Dept. No.2
In this action, the plaintiffs will proceed
against the respective defendants under both
contract and tort theories, as follows:
AS TO OGDEN DUCK CLUB
Contract theory-! t will be the position of
plaintiffs that the right-of-way agreement (Exhibit "A" of plaintiffs' complaint) has been in
continuous force and effect notwithstanding the
construction of the Willard Bay Reservoir Proj~ct, and that said Ogden Duck Club wrongfully,
illegally and unlawfully breached said agreement
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by refusing to permit plaintiffs to use the facilities of the Ogden Duck Club as provided in said
agreement.
This theory will be supported by the rightof-way agreement attached to the complaint and
by the land purchase contract between the Maws
and the United States of America wherein it
was recognized and agreed in Paragraph 3 a as
follows:
"It is understood and agreed that the rights
to be conveyed to the United States as described
in Article 3 hereof shall be free from lien or encumbrance except: (ii) rights-of-way for roads,
(Including the right-of-way granted to the Ogden Duck Club across Tract 95), ... "
AS TO WEBER BASIN WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
Contract theory - Plaintiffs will proceed
against this defendant pursuant to what it conceives to be a valid contract wherein it agreed
to settle a portion of its claim with the United
States of America, which is allied with the Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District in the Willard Bay Project, upon the condition and subject
to the representations made by the Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District through its manager, E. J. Fjeldsted, that plaintiffs would be
reimbursed for their "Duck Club shootihg privileges" if they, and the people associated with
them, would proceed to settle their claims for the
actual lands involved with the United States of
America.
The basis for the aforesaid contract claim
is set forth in 1\tlr. Fjeldsted's letter toW. John
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~Iaw and Sons, Inc., dated July 5, 1957, set
forth in the complaint as Exhibit "B".

Estoppel - Plaintiffs will proceed against
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District under
tort claiming an estoppel against defendant Weber Basin Conservancy District in that the aforesaid letter, Exhibit ''B", wherein Mr. Fjeldsted
promised to separately settle with plaintiffs and
their representatives and associates from the
"Duck Club shooting privileges" if they would
settle their other claims with the United States
of America. Plaintiffs will contend that this representation was relied upon by them and that
they did rely upon the same in settling their
other claims, that Mr. Fjeldsted acted for and
on behalf of said defendant and in writing said
letter (Exhibit "B") he intended that plaintiffs
rely and act upon said letter, as they did, and
that plaintiffs suffered damages by reason of the
refusal of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District to make good upon its representations.
Trespass-Plaintiffs will further proceed
against the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District in tort on the theory that, pursuant to
their agreement with the United States of
America, they still retain the rights across their
lands, even though the route has been changed,
to supply the Ogden Duck Club with a route
whereby it can cross said lands to its present
facilities. Plaintiffs will contend that the fact
that the Ogden Duck Club was required to move
its buildings some distance by reason of the
construction of the Willard Bay Reservoir does
not, in any way, relieve either defendants from
accounting to plaintiffs for the use of a re-routed
road serving the Ogden Duck Club facilities in-
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asmuch as the new road still must traverse the
same properties which the Maws originally
owned albeit the route deviates somewhat from
the former route.
As an alternative to any argument which
can be, or which might be, advanced by either
defendant, to the effect that a new route is being
used through the same properties, plaintiffs will
proceed against Weber Basin Water Conservancy District on the ground and theory that it
deliberately and without legal or justification
trespassed upon the original route used by the
Ogden Duck Club and destroyed it and caused
it to be covered with water, dikes and other facilities so that it cannot ever be used again.

*

*

*

*

It is submitted that the action of the defendants as generalized in the foregoing legal
theories of recovery has, in effect, constituted
a complete taking equivalent to a condemnation
of the full value of the rights in the properties
which plaintiffs enjoyed, and that the reasonable
fair cash market value of their rights constitutes
the measure of damages in this action.
Respectfully submitted,

I sl Glen E. Fuller
Glen E. Fuller
15 East Fourth South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
(It. 30-33)
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How could the contentions of plaintiffs be spelled
out more clearly than in the foregoing statement?

CONCLUSION
It is again submitted that ~hese appellants were
denied the opportunity of putting on evidence which
would develop their theories of recovery in this matter,
and that the procedure used by the Court to dismiss
the action was contrary to law and justice.
Respectfully submitted,
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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